National No-Fault Auto Insurance: The People Need It Now by Hart, Philip A.
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 21 
Issue 2 Winter 1972 Article 4 
1972 
National No-Fault Auto Insurance: The People Need It Now 
Philip A. Hart 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Philip A. Hart, National No-Fault Auto Insurance: The People Need It Now, 21 Cath. U. L. Rev. 259 (1972). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol21/iss2/4 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 21 WINTER 1972 NUMBER 2
National No-Fault Auto Insurance: The People Need It
Now
Philip A. Hart*
A favorite opening line for any politician is "The time has come . . . ." He
generally fills in the blank with a description of a program which he claims the
public desperately needs and must not endure one more day without. The effect
is to proclaim him-in not too subtle tones-as the saviour of mankind, for
discovering this great human need and championing it. Knowing that I risk
being put in this category, I still cannot resist making one of those proclama-
tions: The time has come for a just system of motor-vehicle-accident law which
would seriously reduce the costs of accidents and accident-avoidance.' The time
has come for traffic-accident victims to be fairly, humanely, adequately and
efficiently compensated and rehabilitated.
The time, indeed, has come-not that justice and mercy were not always
needed when we sought to compensate auto accident victims-but because
finally there is a growing awareness that motor vehicle accidents, their resulting
injuries and deaths are a national public health problem of epidemic propor-
tions.2
* A.B., Georgetown University, 1934; J.D., University of Michigan, 1937; United States Sena-
tor from Michigan. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Dean Sharp, Assistant
Counsel, Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee; Robert H. Joost, Assistant Counsel,
Senate Criminal Laws and Procedure Subcommittee; and S. Lynn Sutcliffe, Senate Commerce
Committee, in the collection of these materials.
I. The source for this general observation is G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970).
In this excellent work, Professor Calabresi presents an incisive legal and economic analysis of the
costs of accidents and the goals of accident law.
2. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON TRAFFIC SAFETY 4, 7, 75 (1968) [hereinafter cited as TRAFFIC SAFETY
REPORT]; Altman, New Emergency Room Methods Urged to Cut Trauma Fatalities, New York
Times, Dec. I, 1971; STATE OF NEW YORK INSURANCE DEP'T, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE . . . FOR
WHOSE BENEFIT? 3 (1970) [hereinafter cited as FOR WHOSE BENEFIT]; U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTA-
TION, CAUSATION CULPABILITY, AND DETERRENCE IN HIGHWAY CRASHES 3-4 (1970) (prepared by
D. Klein and J. Waller) [hereinafter cited as Highway Crashes]; R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC
PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM 11-13 (1965); and JOURNAL OF AMERICAN INSURANCE,
Jan./ Feb. 1972, at 5.
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And there is an awareness that we can treat this problem with safer engineer-
ing of cars and roads, increased use of sealtbelts, and other restraint systems,
improved emergency medical care, and improved driver performance and be-
havior-all of which would reduce the number and severity of accidents, and
the amount of accident costs.'
To provide incentives for reducing accident costs and the burden they put on
victims and their families, Senator Warren Magnuson (D-Wash.) and I have
introduced a legislative program.
Three bills in this package seek to bring greater efficiency to the private auto
insurance marketing system. First is the Group Motor Vehicle Insurance Act.
Today, auto policies are sold mostly on a one-salesman, one-motorist basis.
This is inefficient and costly for consumers. For example, of the $14.6 billion
of written motor vehicle premiums in 1970, $1.8 billion was consumed by
commissions and brokerage fees.5 In contrast, three-fourths of those carrying
health insurance are covered under group programs. If auto insurance followed
this three to one ratio, motorists could save an estimated one billion dollars a
year.
But even more substantial savings in dollars-and more importantly in lives
and injuries-could come from enactment of the Motor Vehicle Information
and Cost Savings Act.6 Under this bill, the Secretary of Transportation would
set property-loss-reduction standards requiring manufacturers to build cars
more resistant to damage and less expensive to repair. Also, a study commission
would go to work on finding the best methods of determining various automo-
biles' susceptibility to damage, their repair costs and the degree of occupant
protection-model by model.7 Armed with this type of information, consumers
3. See, e.g., TRAFFIC SAFETY REPORT at xi-xiii; U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, MOTOR
VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES AND THEIR COMPENSATION IN THE UNITED STATES 99-100 (1971) (prepared
by J. Volpe) [hereinafter cited as MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES]; S. REP. No. 92-413, 92d Cong.,
Ist Sess., 33-34 (197 1); HIGHWAY CRASHES at 103-16, 147-83, 209-18; U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTA-
TION, DRIVER BEHAVIOR AND ACCIDENT INVOLVEMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR TORT LIABILITY 123-
40 (1970); JOURNAL OF AMERICAN INSURANCE, Jan./Feb. 1972, at 28-30; Huelke, Automobile
Accidents-Where We've Been, Where We Are, What Needs to be Done, 35 J. OF RISK AND INS.
61(1968).
4. S.946, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971). See also related bills-S.947 and S.948, 92d Cong., Ist
Sess. (1971).
5. Derived from data in 72 BEST'S REVIEW 20-21 (Prop./Liab. Ins. Ed. Nov. 1971).
6. S.976, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971). The bill passed the Senate by a vote of 89 to 4, 117 CONG.
REC. S17,570 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1971). Similar legislation (H.R. 11627, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971))
is pending before the Commerce and Finance Subcommittee of the House Interstate and Foreign
Commerce Committee.
7. S. REP. No. 92-413, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 15-19 (1971). This bill would also require the
Secretary of Transportation to establish motor vehicle diagnostic demonstration projects. Through
[Vol. 21:259
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could make more informed purchasing decisions-with the assumption they
would choose the cars less likely to incur damage and high repair bills. In turn,
manufacturers likely would compete to build cars which met these standards
in order to get the sales. Eventually, insurance companies could rate cars by
make and model according to the vulnerability of an occupant to death or
injury, the susceptibility to damage and the probable repair costs.
In short, the bill seeks to put the marketplace itself to work in providing safer
cars which are less expensive to keep in repair and less expensive to insure.
Perhaps the most ambitious of the three bills is the National No-Fault Motor
Vehicle Insurance Act.' This Act would writefinis to the inefficient, insufficient
and inhumane tort-liability insurance system which wastes consumer dollars,
human lives and court time. The tort insurance system discourages companies
from varying premium rates according to the damage-resistance, repairability
and post-crash-injury-minimization qualities of the policyholder's car. Auto-
bodily-injury and property damage liability insurance pay for damages to a
stranger and the stranger's car. Under tort-liability insurance, companies "can
never know . . . what car they would end up paying for-both as to injury to
its occupants and as to damage to the car itself."9
Worse than that, the present system reflects several basic and conflicting
expectations-few of which are met.' 0 First, tort law is expected to shift accident
loss from the victim only if a wrongdoer can be found, and then only if the
victim was without fault. By making the wrongdoer "pay for his damages,"
tort law is expected to deter careless or dangerous driving behavior." Second,
liability insurance is expected to protect the wrongdoer by defending him and
also to pay for the losses he caused."2 A common fund is created by the premium
diagnostic inspection, it is anticipated that the driving public could further reduce maintenance costs
and vehicle repair charges. Once the demonstration projects have been established, there will be a
data base upon which a sound national policy can be developed for safety and emission inspection
of automobiles.
8. S.945, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971). References in this article are to the latest published
version of this bill in the Senate--Committee Print No. I of S.945 reprinted in 118 CONG. REC.
S550 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1972) with accompanying staff analysis. [Editor's note] After this article
went to press, the Senate Commerce Committee published Committee Prints Nos. 2 and 3 of
S.945.
9. FOR WHOSE BENEFIT 120; see also MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES 99-100.
10. FOR WHOSE BENEFIT 13-14; Bombaugh, The Department of Transportation's Auto Insur-
ance Study and Auto Accident Compensation Reform, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 207, 210 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Bombailg6, DOTStudy]; MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES 29-30.
II. For a general discussion of the development of tort law-"strict" and "fault" liabil-
ity-and their objectives, see James, Analysis of the Origin and Development of the Negligence
Actions, in U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEGLIGENCE
ACTION 35 (1970); MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES 16-21.
12. FOR WHOSE BENEFIT 120. See sources cited note II supra.
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dollars of liability-insurance buyers, mainly through the compulsion and in-
ducement of state financial-responsibility laws. The combination-tort and in-
surance-gives rise to the third expectation-ull compensation for innocent
victims of auto accidents.' 3
That this present system cannot in theory, and has not in practice, lived up
to these conflicting expectations has been well-documented and analyzed over
the past half-century." As Professor H. Laurence Ross commented in 1969:
[Wie ought to be impressed by the fact that the problems [of inade-
quately and uncompensated victims] first noted so long ago . ..
have recurred again and again at different times and in different
places. There have been no disconfirmations of the major findings!
If our knowledge of all social problems were in a state similar to
our knowledge of the traffic victim, we would be a fortunate and
enlightened people. 5
That statement was made before the landmark two and one-half year auto
insurance and compensation study by the Department of Transportation (DOT)
under a joint resolution of Congress was completed."S The wealth of new infor-
mation in this twenty-four volume study provides an incisive analysis of the
human, social, economic and institutional dimensions and workings of the
present system. To the data contained in the DOT study, one must add the
evidence which fills more than 11,000 pages of twenty-four volumes of Congres-
sional hearings."7 This mountain of documentation amply supports Secretary
of Transportation John A. Volpe's conclusion: "the present system needs
13. MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES 15, 22-27; FOR WHOSE BENEFIT 45-48. See H. Ross,
SETTLED OUT OF COURT 243-48 (1970).
14. See I I7 CONG. REC. S1828 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1971). See also Braun, The Financial
Responsibility Law, 3 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 505, nn. 1-3 (1936) for early history, and R. KEETON
AND J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM 124-80 for history since 1932.
15. Ross, Author's Reply, 36 J. OF RISK AND INS. 313 (1969). See also E. Corstvet, The
Uncompensated Accident and Its Consequences, 3 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 466 (1936).
16. Act of May 22, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-313, 82 Stat. 126.
17. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, The Insurance Industry 89th Cong., Ist Sess. thru 92d Cong., pts. 12-19 (1965-71) (eleven
volumes); Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.J. Res. 958, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); Hearings Before
the Senate Commerce Comm. on S.J. Res. 129, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); Hearings Before the
Senate Commerce Comm., Automobile Insurance Study Oversight, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969);
Hearings Before the Senate Commerce Comm., Automobile Insurance and Compensation Study,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance, pts.
14, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); Hearings Before the Senate Commerce Comm. on Automobile
Insurance Reform and Cost Savings, pts. 1-5, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971).
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change badly and needs it now."'" The "now" was March, 1971. Secretary
Volpe summarized his findings about the tort-liability system in these words:
In summary, the existing system ill serves the accident victim, the
insuring public and society. It is inefficient, overly costly, incomplete
and slow. It allocates benefits poorly, discourages rehabilitation and
overburdens the courts and the legal system. Both on the record of
its performance and on the logic of its operation, it does little if
anything to minimize crash losses."
To the thousands of motorists who have written to their Senators and Con-
gressmen about auto insurance and claims problems, these findings are neither
startling nor new. For instance, a motorist from Louisiana wrote:
We who have to drive, who cannot do without cars, are burdened
with outrageous insurance bills, plus capricious cancellations of our
insurance for no cause, plus the prospect of having to pay huge
lawyer's fees if we are involved in any accident, either to recover our
own damages or to attempt to get them from the others involved.
This business of suing, of having to prove "blame", of crowding
already over-crowded court calendars, digging up witnesses, losing
time from work, paying out enormous lawyer's fees, has simply
reached the point of intolerable burdensomeness. We are begging
Congress for relief-we the common people of America3 °
The "common people of America," the typical citizen and his family, fare
the worst under the present system-both as auto-insurance buyers and as auto-
accident victims. For example, poor and moderate-income families, particularly
those with teenage drivers, who live in large metropolitan areas, pay the most
for auto liability insurance and receive the least.2" In serious and fatal injury
18. Hearings Before the Senate Commerce Comm., Automobile Insurance Reform and Cost
Savings, pt. 1, at 105, 107.
19. MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES 100.
20. Letter to the author, June 14, 1971, on file with the Senate Antitrust and Monopoly
Subcommittee.
21. The "pay the most" assertion is demonstrated in TABLE 1, below. "Receive the least" is
shown in TABLE 2. Note also TABLE 17, note 85, infra, and U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION,
AUTOMOBILE PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS, VOL. II, at 108-19 (1970) [hereinafter cited as PERSONAL
INJURY CLAIMS 111 These statistics indicate that residents of urban areas (where most of the poor
and moderate income families live) do in fact "receive the least" in payments under tort insurance.
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TABLE I
COMPARISON OF PRIVATE PASSENGER AUTO LIABILITY INSURANCE
RATES FOR FAMILY WITH TEENAGE OPERATOR LIVING IN TEN
SELECTED CITY AREAS WITH ESTIMATED NATIONAL AVERAGE RATE
FOR SIMILAR INSURANCE
Family with Teenage Operator
Brooklyn, N.Y. $630
Chicago (Central) 386
Cleveland 348
Detroit 334
Hartford 382
Los Angeles (Central) 405
Philadelphia 467
Phoenix 311
Queens, N.Y. 509
St. Louis 338
National Average Rate* $ 73
Note: The above Family rates are for bodily injury $5,000 property damage, compul-
sory, and financial responsibility limits, and $500 medical payments in effect January 1,
1971. They are based on Class 7A of the Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau 22 Class Plan
and the Insurance Services Office 19 Class Plan.
* This was derived by deducting (a) excess limits premiums estimated to be $2.3 billion
(approx. 35% of total bodily injury premiums of $6.6 billion) and (b) commercial motor
vehicle premiums estimated to be $2 billion, from total bodily injury and property
damage liability insurance premiums of $9.5 billion in 1970, and dividing the difference
of $5.2 billion by an estimated 72 million insured private passenger cars in 1970.
Source: U.S. Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee. Family rates were de-
rived from information submitted to the Subcommittee by the Mutual Insurance Rating
Bureau in January, 1971.
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cases, families with incomes under $10,000 (64 percent of the families in this
country in 1969)22 recovered from all sources only 45 percent of their medical,
wage and property damage losses, while families with incomes over $10,000
received from all sources 61 percent of their losses." The alternative, ready and
available, is "no-fault" auto insurance.
TABLE 2
PERCENT OF NET REPARATIONS RECEIVED FROM ALL SOURCES TO
LOSS BY FAMILY INCOME
(Dollars in Billions)
Reparations
Family Income Loss* Net Reparations** to Loss
Under $5,000 $ 1.9 $ 0.7 38%
5,000 - 9,999 2.1 1.1 52
10,000 - and Over 0.8 0.5 61
Unknown income 0.2 0.1
Totals $ 5.1 $ 2.4 49%
* "Loss" means "personal and family loss" of seriously injured and fatality victims,
i.e., medical and wage loss and property damage; future earnings of fatality victims with
dependent survivors.
** After legal costs. Means benefits from families' medical, life, auto medical pay-
ments, collision and other insurance, fault-insurance ("net tort"), sick leave, workmen's
compensation, social security disability, and other sources.
Source: U.S. Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee. Derived from ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES 1. Table 45FS1 at 337.
22. This figure is derived from the following table:
TABLE 3
MOTOR VEHICLE OWNERSHIP BY FAMILY INCOME IN EARLY 1969
(Number of Families)
2 or more All
Income level No vehicles I vehicle vehicles families
Less than $5,000 8,855,460 8,277,930 2,117,610 19,251,000
$5,000 to $7,499 1,291,680 5,564,160 3,080,160 9,936,000
$7,500 to $9,999 633,420 5,278,500 4,645,080 10,557,000
$10,000 to $14,999 571,320 5,141,880 8,569,800 14,283,000
$15,000 or more 242,190 2,179,710 5,651,100 8,073,000
Total 11,594,070 26,442,180 24,063,750 62,100,000
Source: U.S. Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee; derived from 1969
SURVEY OF CONSUNFR FINANCES at 8, 67, and 72.
23. See TABLE 2, supra note 21.
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The Hart-Magnuson Bill-S.945: Committee Print No. /
"No-fault" comes in many forms, sizes and shapes. To add to the confusion
the name has even been attached to plans that don't deserve the title.2" The
proposal which Senator Warren G. Magnuson and I introduced and which has
been progressively refined after extensive hearings, investigations and analyses
is Committee Print No. I of S. 945. It is a simple, yet comprehensive bill.
Basically, the "National No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act" would estab-
lish a compulsory nationwide system of speedy, complete and efficient compen-
sation of all the economic losses of all drivers, passengers and pedestrians killed,
maimed or injured by automobiles. This no-fault, no-lawsuit plan would pro-
vide these benefits to be paid by the policyholder's own insurance company:
(a) all costs of medical, hospital, surgical, and nursing services appropriately
and necessarily incurred; (Sec. 2(13)(A));
(b) all rehabilitation expenses, such as psychiatric, physical and occupational
rehabilitation, appropriately and necessarily incurred (Sec. 2(13)(B));
(c) all lost after-income-tax earnings for the period during which the victim
is unable to work as a result of the auto injury, including lost earnings antici-
pated or those that could be reasonably expected-up to $1,000 a month (Sec.
2(13)(C) and (D));
(d) all appropriately and necessarily incurred expenses for services the victim
would have performed for self or family, but for the accident and injury (Sec.
2(13)(E)(i));
(e) all funeral expenses appropriately and necessarily incurred (Sec. 2(13)(E)
(ii));
(f) all attorney's fees and court costs incurred in actually collecting benefits
(Sec. 2(13)(E)(iii));
(g) an amount equal to the damage or loss to property incurred plus the
rental cost of a substitute vehicle pending repairs (less optional deductibles)
(Sec. 2(16)(B)).
24. See. e.g., series of articles by Miriam Ottenberg in the Washington Star: Lawyers Lobbying
Against No-Fault Insurance, July 6, 1971; More for Less With No-Fault, July 7, 1971; and,
Lawyer-Critics State Case Against No-Fault, July 8, 1971, reprinted with remarks in 117 CONG.
REC. S 12,639 (daily ed. July 30, 197 1); and see Counterfeit Reforms, Christian Science Monitor,
May 17, 1971, at 18, reprinted in 117 CONG. REC. S 12,644 (daily ed. July 30, 1971). See also
Washington Star, Jan. II, 1972, at A-8; BUSINESS INSURANCE, Sept. 27, 1971, at 18; UNITED
STATES INVESTOR, Sept. 29, 1971, at 35. For an analysis and description of current auto insurance
first-party liability and no-fault proposals, see Institute for the Future, The Automobile Insurance
System: Current Status and Some Proposed Revisions, Working Paper 18 (Dec. 1971).
[Vol. 21:259
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Committee Print No. I is consumer legislation, designed to protect the tens
of millions who buy automobile insurance each year as well as to compensate
the millions injured. The insurance buyer would be protected in several ways:
(a) no longer need he fear being sued for damages-there is total freedom
from tort lawsuits, unless the owner, operator or user was engaged in criminal
conduct (Sec. 3);
(b) no longer need he fear cancellation or non-renewal of his insurance if he
files a claim, is found liable in a lawsuit or belongs to a minority
group-insurers can refuse to insure only if the applicant lacks or loses a valid
driver's license or fails to pay the premium (Sec. 5(g));
(c) no longer need he wait months or years after an accident to receive
benefits-amounts unpaid 30 days after the insurer receives reasonable proof
of loss bear interest at the rate of two percent a month (24 percent a year) on
the unpaid balance (Sec. 5(c)(1));
(d) no longer need he buy both "collision" and "property damage liability"
insurance policies-the two forms of overlapping coverage are merged on a
"no-fault" basis (which the motorist can buy or not as he chooses) (Sec.
5(c)(l));
(e) no longer would he be the "victim" of the complexities of insurance-
policy language in trying to choose between competing insurers-the bill re-
quires the gathering and publication of complete price and claim-payment in-
formation in much the same manner that truth-in-lending legislation requires
information on the true cost of credit (Sec. 6).
In addition, this bill provides that:
(a) insurance companies would not be allowed to shift losses among them-
selves -- "subrogation," either by lawsuit or arbitration would be disallowed;
(b) the automobile-accident victim, if he does not have automobile insurance
(i.e. a pedestrian), shall recover non-pecuniary "general damages," for exam-
ple, for pain and suffering, and for inconvenience, from the company which
insures the driver who struck him (Sec. 5(b)(l)); in other cases the victim may
recover such non-pecuniary losses if he buys an optional "pain and suffering"
rider on his automobile insurance policy 5 (Sec. 5(c)(2)(B));
25. For a description of the elements which together constitute "general damages," see FAULT
OR No-FAULT 32 (Nat'l Conference on Automobile Ins., 1970). The following elements could be
said to be "non-pecuniary":
-inconvenience and discomfort
-fright or shock
1972]
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(c) the injured policyholder would receive benefits from any public health
insurance and from any private insurance, before looking to his automobile
policy (Sec. (2)(15)), and the insurance company must offer premium reduc-
tions reflecting these benefits (Sec. 5 (e));
(d) no part of any no-fault personal injury benefit payments may be applied
as attorney's fees-if the victim must go to court to collect, the insurance
company must pay reasonable attorney's fees to the lawyer in addition to the
benefits and interest (Sec. 8(a)).
Injustice and the Tort System
Many trial lawyers vehemently defend the present system on the ground that it
compensates the "innocent" and punishes the "guilty." In fact, it seems it was
the trial lawyers who popularized the phrase "no-fault" to describe first-party
automobile accident compensation insurance by using the term widely and
constantly as a pejorative. "No-fault" was "immoral" because it deviated
from the "Judeo-Christian" concept of individual responsibility and treated the
-humiliation, indignity or insult
-physical pain and suffering
-mental anguish
-loss of enjoyment of life
-loss of consortium (society or companionship)
-worry about the future consequences of an injury.
The following elements might be considered "pecuniary":
-loss of earning capacity
-temporary and permanent disability
-aggravation of a pre-existing physical condition or disease
-impairment of physical ability
-impairment of mental ability
-disfigurement
-dismemberment
-loss of bodily function
These "pecuniary" elements would be covered under the no-fault benefits of S. 945, Committee
Print No. I, and optional coverages. (See Secs. 5(a) § (c)(2)(A)).
In the DOT study lost future earnings were estimated in two ways. One estimate was
based on the concept of societal loss. This estimate includes the discounted value of
future lost earnings of all fatalities and seriously injured persons and does not adjust
downward the future earnings of fatalities because of savings in maintenance cost. [i.e.,
if the individual had been permanently disabled there would have been costs for main-
taining him]. Homemakers were imputed on earnings equivalent of $4,000 per year.
Future losses, estimated in this manner, are referred to as "societal" losses. The other
concept of future lost earnings is referred to as "personal and family loss." It was com-
puted by excluding from societal losses:
I. Future lost earnings, due to fatality, of all members of the household except heads
of households and their spouses,
2. Future lost earnings of all fatalities who had no surviving members of the family,
3. Maintenance costs [discounted cost of $2,000 per year was used] of all persons
killed in accidents.
[Vol. 21:259
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"innocent" and "guilty" alike.2" In due course the pejorative connotation dis-
appeared, as the benefits and advantages became more and more evident, but
the label "no-fault" stuck, and the tort-liability insurance system was called
the "fault" system.
Under the theory of tort law there can be a shifting of losses from the
"defendant" driver to the "plaintiff" driver only if the defendant was negligent
and the plaintiff was free from negligence. If both parties were negligent, there
should be no recovery; if neither party was negligent, there should be no recov-
ery; if the plaintiff was free from negligence but incurred no loss there should
be no recovery. Application of the theory to the world of automobile accidents
in fact shows that no more than one-third to one-half of automobile-accident
victims are entitled to compensation under the tort system. One DOT study of
seriously injured accident victims (the cases which the insurers contest the most)
found just that-only 45 percent of the seriously injured victims recovered from
the tort system.2
U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT INJURIES,
vol. 1, at 23 (1970) [hereinafter cited as ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES 1].
TABLE 4
Traffic Violation Status Percent of "Innocent"
of Driver Insured Vehicle Accident Victims Involved
Possible Criminal Type
Conduct:
Drunk driving I.7%
Reckless driving 2.7
Speed 2.3
6.7%
Violations Not Involving
Possible Criminal Type
Conduct 30.4
No Violations Reported 62.9
Total 100.0%
See also H. Ross, supra note 13, at 22; Letter to the Editor from Prof. J. O'Connell, New York
Times, Jan. 4, 1972.
26. The use of the word "guilty" implies criminal type driving conduct. A DOT study
(HIGHWAY CRASHES) found that 93 percent of those drivers causing injury to "innocent" accident
victims were not cited for possible criminal type driving behavior (drunk or reckless driving, or
even speeding). See the following table:
27. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES I at 23. MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES 35, 94; see Pinnick v.
Cleary, 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971). This case was commented on in 117 CONG. REC. 10,939, 92d Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1971) where it was observed:
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Fundamental fairness suggests that each of these "innocent" plaintiffs
should fare equally well under the present system. Nevertheless, some categories
of seriously injured persons do considerably better than others.
Of the 494,000 seriously and fatally injured accident victims with known loss,
214,000 received some payment, and 280,000 received nothing from tort-
Justice Reardon . . . dwelt on one advantage of no-fault which has not received the
attention it deserves. He wrote:
No one who has for any time been in charge of a trial court system (as was the
author of this option [sic] for a number of years) can be unfamiliar with the
devastating effect upon the administration of justice which the automobile has
produced. For years, in the face of countless experiments the trial calendars of this
country, particularly in metropolitan areas, have become increasingly clogged with
motor vehicle tort litigation. No one as yet, notwithstanding heroic efforts in this
regard, has found a satisfactory method of disentangling this morass.
The problems of society to which the courts have been called no longer permit
the luxury of using them as a forum for resolving the ever increasing numbers of
automobile accident claims to the extent that has obtained hitherto.
Other non-American court systems, heirs with ourselves of the common law,
have managed to solve this problem of the super-abundance of motor vehicle tort
claims in one way or another. It remains, however, a cancer to be rooted out in
American Courts. [271 N.E.2d 602-04.]
Mr. President, to demonstrate just how pervasive this cancer is, I call attention to a
chart [see TABLE 5, below] which I ask unanimous consent to have printed at the
conclusion of my remarks. This shows that, as of December 31, 1970, the 10 leading
auto insurers alone were defending 359,540 personal injury liability cases filed during
the preceding 8 or more years. Most of these cases, of course, involved seriously injured
auto accident victims seeking compensation. Yet, 57 percent of the cases filed 3 or more
years ago; 40 percent filed 4 or more years ago; and 13 percent were filed 6 or more
years ago. Since cases are usually filed sometime after the accident occurred-and State
statutes of limitations vary from I to 6 years-this data actually understates the period
these accident victims must wait for any possible compensation. Prompt compensation
and any needed rehabilitation for these victims are indeed dim prospects. It is inhumane
to perpetuate a reparations system which permits this.
TABLE 5
AUTO PERSONAL INJURY LIABILITY CASES PENDING AS OF DEC. 31, 1970,
WHICH WERE FILED. AND WHICH WERE BEING DEFENDED BY THE 10 LEADING
AUTO INSURERS UNDER POLICIES ISSUED DURINGTHE PRECEDING$ OR
MORE YEARS.
Years in which policies were issued
Companies Prior to
1%3 1963 1964 1%5 2,608 1%7 1968 1969 1970 Total
State Farm ......................... 300 363 819 1.915 3.328 6,911 9.788 16679 7,502 47,605
Allstate ....................... 2,326 1,744 2.970 3,487 9,782 16,702 14,454 31.815 14,176 99,456
Aetna Casualty ..................... 417 345 918 1.790 3,024 4,616 3,257 7.687 3,232 25,286
Traelers ....................... 903 759 1,428 2,512 5,015 8.219 8.137 11,313 4,590 42.876
Nationwide ...................... 1.026 833 1,288 1,555 2,634 4.313 53,518 6,731 3,280 27.178
Liberty Mutual ...................... 523 407 750 1,225 2,640 4.942 4,.546 8.371 3,689 27,093
Hartford Accident .............. 878 600 1,204 1,941 3.307 5.276 4,239 7,159 3,015 27.619
Government Employees ............... 140 195 392 911 2.060 4,206 3.477 7,323 3.583 22,287
INA ............................ 588 535 1,079 1.598 2.577 3,611 2,729 3,987 1,517 18,221
Lumbermans Mutual ................. 424 472 750 1,515 2,608 3,791 3,823 5.740 2.7% 21,919
Total .......................... 7,525 6,253 11,598 20,559 36,975 62.477 59,968 106,805 47.380 359.540
Note: These 10 companies wrote approximately 40percent of the personal injury liability premiums in 1970,
Source: 1970 annual statements, schedule P. pt. I, filed with State insurance departments.
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insurance.2s The 214,000 victims were able to show that another driver was "at
fault," and that they were free from fault. All of these victims receiving pay-
ment were "paid" claimants, "an implicit concession that they passed the
liability threshold."'" These victims were "innocent" within the meaning of the
present tort-insurance system. Yet, 52,000 victims with losses of $2,500 or more
recovered less than one-half of that loss.30 In all, 53 percent of these 214,000
"innocent" victims recovered something less than their tangible loss and abso-
lutely nothing for their intangible loss, such as "pain and suffering."',
According to one DOT study, pedestrians seriously injured in an automobile
accident recovered 93 percent of their total economic loss from all sources,
whereas passengers in a car, truck or commercial vehicle recovered only 36
percent, and the drivers of cars, trucks or taxis recovered only 58 percent of
their total economic loss.3 2
Most important, tort insurance may force the law-enforcement and the judi-
cial systems to spend precious police-investigative time, judges' time, and court
time to find that the defendant was at "fault" in a particular accident. But this
28. See the following table:
TABLE 6
DISTRIBUTION OF NUMBER OF PERSONS KILLED AND SERIOUSLY INJURED BY RATIO OF NET
TORT SETTLEMENT TO TOTAL ECONOMIC LOSS BY AMOUNT OF TOTAL ECONOMIC LOSS (1967)
Total economic loss
$1,000 to $2,000 to $10,000 All
Ratio of settlement to total economic loss $1 to $999 $2,499 $9,999 or more persons
Under .50 ................................ 7,526 26,555 26,068 60,149
.50 to .99 ................................. 4,441 22,397 22,380 4,625 53,843
1.00 to 1.99 .............................. 16,445 26,569 19,270 1,562 63,846
2.00 to 3.99 .............................. 10,132 13,701 3,349 246 27,428
4.99 or over .............................. 6,300 1,307 1,242 8,849
Total ............................... 37,318 71,500 72,796 32,501 214,115
None ................................... 42,352 91,795 103,125 42,743 280,015
Settlem ent unknow n . ................................................................. 18,968
Total in study ........................................................................ 513,098
Source: U.S. Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee. Derived from ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES 1, Table
25FSI at 238.
29. PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS I at 66.
30. TABLE 6, supra note 28.
31. Id. See also MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES 37.
32. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES I, Tables 3.27, at 55; Table 49S at 344-45, and Table 49FSI,
at 346-47.
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finding has no real meaning. The damages are paid by an insurance company,
and no sanctions whatever in the form of loss of license or prison sentence are
imposed on the person found at "fault." What kind of a "fault" system is this?
Malapportionment, Insufficiency, Delay, and Inefficiency
Let us return to our examination of the actual workings of the present system.
The DOT study has confirmed an assumption that has commonly been made
for a number of years: "small claims tend to be settled sooner, and perhaps
with less controversy, than larger claims."' 3 In one survey:
half of the claims were settled in less than six months after the
accident. Half of the loss dollars involved in all claims had not been
settled until more than a year had elapsed, and the same is true for
total payments on these claims.3
This finding evidences, once again, the present system's misguided priorities
with respect to human needs-the least seriously injured not only get relatively
more benefits per loss dollar than the more seriously and fatally injured,3 but
they get them much faster.
33. MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES 42; see also Bombaugh, DOTStudy. supra note 10, at 219.
34. MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES 42.
35. See the following table:
TABLE 7
HOW AUTO ACCIDENT VICTIMS FARED UNDER THE TORT-LIABILITY
INSURANCE SYSTEM
1967 (Millions of Dollars)
Nature of Number of Victims Injured Victims Average
Victims' Recovering from Net
Injury Tort Ro
Injured Recovering Average Average Average
from Tort Lossa Recoveryb Loss
Fatal 59,173 19,703 $39,325c $5,497 14%
Very Seriousd 31,139 13,181 71,371 8,767 12
Seriouse 423,027 181,231 3,648 2,263 62
Less-Serious 3,750,000 1,050,220 f 224 916 309
a. "Personal and family loss," i.e., medical and wage loss, and future earnings loss of
fatality victims with dependent survivors. See ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES I at 23. Prop-
erty loss has been excluded from all data in this table.
b. After legal fees and expenses.
c. Includes some $920 million of young adult future lost earnings.
d. Victims with $25,000 or more of "personal and family loss."
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Further evidence of the system's malapportionment of benefits between those
with small dollar loss and the more seriously injured with large dollar loss is
found in the DOT "Economic Consequences" study."6 This study:
e. "Serious injury," as defined in ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES I at 17 is an injury which
resulted in: "Medical costs (excluding hospital) of $500 or more, or two weeks or more
of hospitalization, or, if working, three weeks or more of missed work, or, if not working,
six weeks or more of missed normal activity."
f. Estimated by dividing net tort recovery of $1,062 million by 1967 bodily injury
average paid claims cost of $916, after deducting average loss adjustment expenses of
$200 [Best's Aggregates and Averages, 131,203 (1968) and average plaintiffs' attorneys
fees of $316 (27.3% of $1,232-see PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS I at 73] from $1,423 [gross
bodily injury average paid claims cost as reported in Insurance Facts-1971 at 52].
Source: U.S. Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee. Derived from data in
MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES 2, 5, 6 (Table 2) and II; ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES 1,
Table 7S at 85, Table 7F at 87, Table 75SI at 89, Table 15S at 149, Table 15F at 151,
and Table 15FSI at 155.
36. See the following tables:
TABLE 8
SERIOUSLY (NON-FATALLY) INJURED VICTIMS RECOVERING FROM
TORT AND OTHER SOURCES BY CATEGORY OF LOSS
Average Recovery Pay/ Loss Ratios
Category Number of Average Tort after Other Other
of Loss Victims Loss Legal Costs Sources Tort Sources Total
$1 to $9,999 166,349 $2,718 $2,365 $2,275 87% 84% 171%
$10,000 and
over 28,063 $45,056 $8,779 $4,404 19% 10% 29%
Source: U.S. Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee. Derived from
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES I, Table 27S at 248-49.
TABLE 9
SERIOUSLY INJURED PERSONS RECEIVING BENEFITS FROM TORT-
INSURANCE ONL YTO LOSS BY AMOUNT OF LOSS
Ratio-
Amount Persons Average Average Benefits Benefits
of Loss* Injured* Loss after Legal Costs To Loss
$I to$999 37,318 $ 634 $1,408 2.22
1,000 to 2,499 71,500 1,678 2,399 I.43
2,500 to 9,999 72,796 4,624 4,052 0.88
10,000 or more 32,501 52,659 9,048 0.17
* "Personal and family loss", i.e., medical and wage loss and property damage;
future earnings of fatlity victims with dependent survivors.
** Includes fatality victims.
Source: U.S. Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee. Derived from ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES 1. Table 27FS at 250.
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is without question the most comprehensive and carefully conducted
study of the plight of people injured by motor vehicles ever produced
and no solution to the myriad problems of the compensation system
is possible without a thorough understanding of its implications.3"
"Economic Consequences" shows that auto accident victims who are killed,
or who endure very serious injuries suffer the greatest amount of uncompen-
sated lost future earnings. 8 The very seriously injured, not only fare poorly with
respect to recovering their future earnings loss, but also with respect to recover-
ing their out-of-pocket medical expenses. For example, seriously injured victims
with medical expenses of $5,000 or more recovered 55 percent of those expenses
from all sources. 39 Yet, those victims with medical losses under $5,000 recovered
90 percent of their losses.4 0
Seriously injured accident victims 25 years of age or older, who had no
formal education or completed 12 years or less of schooling recovered only 38
percent of their losses from all sources, while those who received some college
education received from all recovery sources 73 percent of their losses.4 ,
The youthful driver pays high auto liability insurance rates, but when injured
or killed in an auto accident he recovers low benefits from the system. For
example, a 20-year-old with a clean driving record who lives in a large city will
pay from three to nine times the national average rate for private passenger auto
37. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES I, at iii. The study focuses "on economic losses (on a per
individual or per family basis) due to serious injury or death from motor vehicle accidents and
reparations for such losses from various sources." Id. at 17. "Serious injury" is defined in the study
to be an injury which resulted in:
Medical costs (excluding hospital) of $500 or more, or two weeks or more of hospitaliza-
tion, or, if working, three weeks or more of missed work, or, if not working six weeks
or more of missed normal activity.
Id.
The total "economic losses" attributed to an individual in the study consisted of two types of
economic losses. One type
is referred to as 'losses to date' and consists of actual expenses or losses incurred during
or attributable to the period of time between the date of the accident and the date of the
interview. Included in this type of loss are actual hospital costs, other medical costs,
property damage and accumulated wage loss for the period.
Id. at 19. The other type of economic loss is expected medical, earnings and other future losses.
Future losses were discounted to present values using an interest rate of six percent and in inflation
factor of three percent. (ld. at 23).
38. Compare "$25,000 or more" loss category in ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES I, at 86, 88, 90
with that cited at 148-50, 151-53, 154-56. See also PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS 1, at 28, 32 and Tables
IV-6, IV-7, at 33.
39. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES I at 281.
40. Id.
41. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES I, Table 46S, at 338.
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liability insurance. 2 Yet, if the data that was uncovered in the DOT study of
compensation for accident victims in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area
holds true nationwide, the odds are only about one in two that this 20-year-
old would collect anything from tort insurance if he were injured or killed in
an accident."3 The District of Columbia study showed that the families of 99
of 202 fatalities received nothing from tort insurance-as did more than
9,000 of 21,000 injury victims." In that study, 78 percent of the medical,
wage, property and future earnings loss for fatality victims was uncompen-
sated-with tort insurance compensating for only 6.8 percent. 5
Persons who had been "working" at the time they were injured in the auto
crash accounted for two-thirds of all seriously and fatally injured claimants,
and incurred two-thirds of the total medical expenses and almost seven-eighths
of the total current and future wage loss. 6 The "working" individual and his
family, although they contribute the most to the private and public common
insurance pools-including auto liability insurance-receive little in return. The
average loss for the "working" auto fatality claimaint was $40,400 (93 percent
of this figure is attributable to future wage loss); the average settlement his
family received from all recovery sources, including tort insurance, was a mea-
ger $2,080-five percent of the loss. 7 The "working" individual who was in-
jured sustained an average loss of $11,500; he received from all recovery
sources -including tort-an average settlement of $4,380-38 percent of his
42. Derived from information submitted to the Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee
by the Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau in January, 1971. See TABLE I, supra note 21, for "Na-
tional Average Rate." The bodily injury and property damage financial responsibility rates includ-
ing medical payments for a 20-year-old are, for example: $579 in Los Angeles; $542 in Chicago-
$676 in Philadelphia; $486 in Cleveland; $459 in D.C.; $699 in Newark; $224 in Atlanta; $471 in
Brooklyn; $437 in Queens; $465 in Detroit; and $605 in San Francisco.
43. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, COMPENSATION FOR MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT LOSSES
IN THE METROPOLITAN AREA OF WASHINGTON, D.C., Table 14, at 29 (1970).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES I, Table 53 FS I, at 356.
47. See the following table:
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loss."' And the more serious his injuries are, the greater the financial burden he
and his family must carry alone without the support of funds from private and
public insurance sources-the money which is needed for decent medical, and
rehabilitative care, and to support his family while he is incapacitated. But the
terrible irony of the present system is that those least seriously injured receive
a disproportionate share from tort-insurance in relation to their medical and
wage loss. The corollary of these two observations is that as the magnitude of
the victim's injuries, his need for care, and his resulting loss increase, the victim
48. See the following table:
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and his family must by necessity rely more and more on private and public
sources other than tort-insurance.4 9
The families of those auto death victims who were "going to school" or
"keeping house" at the time of the accident recover pitifully little from the tort
49. See the following table:
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insurance system. 50 A person who was "going to school" had an average loss
of $1,954, exclusive of any future earnings loss, but his or her family received
an average settlement from all sources of only $133, or seven percent.5t If
"societal" future lost earnings of $920 million had been included, the average
loss per student would have been $106,500 but recovery would have remained
the same $133.52 A person who was "keeping house" at the time of the accident
had an average loss of $3,133, exclusive of any earnings loss, yet his or her
family would have recovered an average settlement from all sources of only
$377, or 12 percent.5 3 If potential future lost earnings of $190 million had been
included, the average loss would have been $32,800, but his or her family's
recovery would have remained only $377 .4
Future lost earnings are the biggest element of loss for seriously injured auto
accident victims who were "working" at the time they were injured-$1.6
billion as compared with $1.5 billion for their current wage, medical and prop-
erty loss combined. 5  In fact, current wages and future lost earnings account
for 63 percent of the total losses (exclusive of property damage) recovered by
all seriously or fatally injured auto accident victims.56
The DOT studies point up clearly that the present system completely malap-
portions benefits to the detriment of those fatally and very seriously injured who
qualify under tort law for compensation. Eighty-nine percent of the losses of
fatality victims and 68 percent for the very seriously injured are compensated
by sources other than tort. 7 Furthermore, fault-insurance delivers its malappor-
tioned benefits under an outrageously costly and exasperatingly slow pace of
operations. Small losses are routinely overcompensated with or without attor-
ney representation, and large losses are tragically undercompensated.
In one study-a survey of auto personal injury liability claims closings made
by 16 leading auto insurance companies over a two week period in late
1969-89 percent of all paid claimants with medical and wage loss (excluding
future lost earnings) under $1,000 accounted for 23 percent of the total medical
and wage loss suffered but they received 46 percent of all payments after plain-
tiffs' attorneys fees. 58 On the other hand, one-half of one percent of all-paid
50. See TABLE 10, supra note 47.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See Table 1I, supra note 48.
56. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES I, Table 7FSI, at 89.
57. See Table 12, supra note 49.
58. PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS I, Tables V-8 and V-9, at 50-55.
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claimants with medical and wage loss of $10,000 or more sustained 16 percent
of all such loss, but these claimants only received seven percent of all payment
dollars after attorneys' fees. 9 In fact, paid claimants with no medical or wage
loss whatsoever received twice as much money as paid claimants who suffered
loss in excess of $25,000!0
Ninety-eight and six-tenths percent of claimants with losses between $1 and
$500 recovered at least three-fourths of their loss from the tort system, but only
27 percent of claimants suffering losses over $25,000 recovered three-fourths of
their loss.6" One-third of the claimants with loss between one dollar and $500
(72 percent of all paid claimants) 62 recovered over four and one-half times their
medical and wage loss; but, only one-twentieth of the claimants with loss be-
tween $10,001 and $25,000 (0.4 percent of all paid claimants) 3 did as well. 4
The families of those killed, and the victims with permanent total disabilities
fare worst under tort-insurance. The overwhelming bulk of loss absorbed by
these victims with total loss in excess of $25,000 was lost future earnings.6 5
Fatality victims recovered only 43 percent of their average medical, wage and
future earnings loss of $22,894. Victims with permanent total disabilities re-
ceived a mere 16 percent of their average loss of $78,000.6 These loss recoveries
have been computed before any deductions for plaintiffs' attorneys fees. Other
data in this study, however, show "a clear pattern of greater attorney involve-
ment in more serious injury cases." 67 The report of the insurance industry's
representatives on the study observed that "nearly 41% of these cases
[permanent injury or death cases] go to suit and another 31% have attorney
representation, compared with 15% and 29% for the remaining cases." ' Plain-
tiffs' attorneys represented 41 percent of paid claimants and 55 percent of loss
dollars of those with $1 to $500 of medical and wage loss; they represented,
however, 86 percent of paid claimants and 89 percent of loss dollars of those
with $25,000 or more of loss. 9 The impact of amount of loss on overall fee
income of plaintiffs' attorneys compared to their workload is indicated by the
data. For instance, claimants with losses under $1,000 constituted 82 percent
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id., Table V-16, at 58.
62. Id., Table V-8, at 50.
63. Id.
64. Id., Table V-16, at 58.
65. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES I at 53 and Table 7FSI, at 90.
66. PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS I at 53.
67. Id. at 73.
68. Id. at 122.
69. Id., Table VI-1, at 73.
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of plaintiffs' lawyers' clients, 73 percent of all successful lawsuits, and 42
percent of plaintiffs' attorneys fees.70 On the other hand, claimants with losses
in excess of $5,000 accounted for 2.6 percent of plaintiffs' lawyers' clients, 4.5
percent of all successful lawsuits, but 18.5 percent of plaintiffs' attorneys fees.7'
Some would say that the compensation problems of certain non-qualifying
victims (e.g., under contributory negligence, guest and other similar type im-
munity rules), and qualifying victims who have insolvent or inadequate defen-
dants (insurers) to collect against, would be solved by comparative negligence,
abolition of immunity rules, and compulsory liability insurance with high lim-
its. Others would claim that no auto accident victim need go uncompensated if
some medical and income loss benefits were to be paid on a first party, absolute
liability (i.e., insurer would pay regardless of fault) basis with such benefit
payments to be set off against any subsequent amount recovered by the victim
from a negligent party's insurer.
These proposals, and others advanced from time to time, only reinforce
society's expectation that tort insurance should compensate auto accident vic-
tims. Because of the present system's inherent inefficiences and self-defeating
contradictions, "the only prospect for the present system is more delays, higher
premiums and worse misallocations of resources.""2 As New York State Super-
intendent of Insurance, Richard E. Stewart pointed out:
Further attempts to modernize the fault insurance system by tinker-
ing with it, while leaving its essentials intact, are sure to be expensive
and self-defeating. The operators of the present system would just
be buying themselves time with other people's money.73
The tort-insurance system, in attempting to effectuate the compensation ex-
pectation, completely malapportions benefits, aids and abets the misallocation
of other recovery sources, inhibits the restoration of health and productivity,
wastes valuable judicial resources, and discourages more efficient and fairer
methods to maximize the reduction of accident and accident avoidance costs.
Tort-insurance, as the theoretical main source for compensation of auto acci-
dent injuries, blinds us as to the human needs of the families of the fatally
injured, the permanently disabled and all victims suffering from short and long-
term impairments. By focusing on the human shortcomings of individual driv-
ers and assessing loss costs on the basis of driving errors, we are denying
70. Id., Table VI-3, at 75.
71. Id.,
72. FOR WHOSE BENEFIT 55.
73. Id.
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ourselves a systematic approach to reducing accident costs."
Compared with other accident reparation systems, such as workmen's com-
pensation, automobile tort insurance is excruciatingly slow in delivering bene-
fits to victims. The Division of Industrial Accidents for the State of California
reported that for the period July through December, 1970, 77.9 percent of
workmen's compensation cases were paid their first check within Jourteen days
of the date of disability, and the balance of the cases were all paid their first
check within twenty-nine days.75 On the other hand, a DOT survey showed that
within thirty days after the date that auto accident injuries were sustained, only
21 percent of all paid claims had been settled, and the benefits paid on these
74. For instance, "about one-half of all fatalities involves drinking drivers, and at least one-
half of that one-half involves problem drinkers". J. O'CONNELL, THE INJURY INDUSTRY 132 (1971).
But, we are now beginning to approach the problem of alcoholism from a public health perspective
rather than viewing it solely as a problem of public order-the "punitive" and "moralistic"
approach. See TRAFFIC SAFETY REPORT 73-80; The State of the Union-Address by the President
of the United States, 118 CONG. REC. H 154 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1972), wherein President Nixon
called for "stronger programs to help the problem drinker" [emphasis added]. See also U.S. DEP'T
OF TRANSPORTATION, ALCOHOL AND HIGHWAY SAFETY: BEHAVIORAL AND MEDICAL ASPECTS
(1971) (prepared by M. Perrine, J. Waller, and L. Harris).
Former Attorney General John N. Mitchell wrote recently, with respect to the problem of
handling public drunkenness: "Alcoholism as such is not a legal problem-it is a health problem.
More simple drunkenness per se should not be handled as an offense subject to the processes of
justice. It should be handled as an illness, subject to medical treatment." Mitchell, The System Is
a "Desperate Injustice" to Alcoholics, New York Times, Feb. 15, 1971, at 33, col. 5.
With respect to the problem drinker and his driving: "'[Ilt's not enough to get the problem
drinker off the road. We want to get him out from behind wheel and into a rehabilitation program',
says John W. Terwilliger, director of a $2.6 million program for problem drinkers who try to drive
in the Baltimore area". Washington Post, Jan. 16, 1972.
As Professor O'Connell stated succinctly:
[Wlill the prospect of being held liable months or years after the event, and thereby
having his insurance company pay damages on his behalf, deter him from drinking?
Conversely, will the prospect of not being paid damges from someone else, months or
years after the accident, deter him? To ask the question is to answer it. If all the
immediate misery the problem drinker causes himself and his family does not deter him
from his dangerous drinking, to suggest that such remote and hypothetical possibilities
will affect his behavior is ludicrous.
J. O'CONNELL, THE INJURY INDUSTRY 132. He concluded:
IT]he best thinking on traffic safety today would put the lowest priority on trying to
change the driver. And it would put the lowest priority on trying to change the driver on
trying to change the drinking driver; and it would put the lowest priority in trying to
change the drinking driver on trying to change the drinking driver through threats
concerning insurance claims. And so trial lawyers, in emphasizing as they continually
do the supposedly detrimental effect on traffic safety of no-fault insurance in its treat-
ment of the drinking driver, are emphasizing the lowest item of priority on the lowest
item of priority on the lowest item of priority.
Id. at 134. For a discussion of the general proposition, see G. CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 268-71.
75. See 117 CONG. REc. S12,464 (daily ed. July 29, 1971).
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represented a mere 3.5 percent of the total payments on all paid claims."6 This
comparison points up, not only how speedy workmen's compensation is com-
pared with tort-insurance, but it also illustrates the one-final-lump-sum-
payment problem of tort-insurance-79 percent of the claimants eventually
paid received nothing to cover their immediate losses for the first thirty days
after the accident.7" Only 23 percent of the nearly 24,000 non-permanently
injured or fatality victims in this same survey were paid within 30 days after
the accident." Payment for these victims was even slower where their losses were
large or they were represented by counsel. A mere one percent of the victims
with medical and wage loss in excess of $2,000 were paid within 30 days after
the accident; at least 25 percent of those victims with medical and wage loss of
one dollar to $500 were paid within 30 days. 9 Forty percent of the victims in
the survey with medical and wage loss of any size who were without attorney
representation, were paid within 30 days; one percent of the victims who were
represented by an attorney were paid within that time. 0
The more serious the injuries the longer the victim must wait for compensa-
tion under the present system. Of the permanently and totally disabled claim-
ants in this survey, none had his claim settled within 30 days after the accident,
and only one had his settled within 90 days after the accident.8 Furthermore it
seems to take longer for the permanently disabled represented by counsel to
receive payment than it takes for those not so represented. For example, less
than two percent of the permanently and partially disabled victims in the survey
had their claims settled within 90 days following the accident; 25 percent of the
victims with such injuries had their claims settled within that period.8"
Additional analysis of the detailed data presented in this survey shows that
the multiple of payment to medical and wage loss for the permanently and
partially disabled who were represented by an attorney (after deducting one-
third for legal fees) was less than the multiples for those similarly injured
victims without attorney representation. 3 Whereas victims in the survey with
large losses ($2,001 or more) who were represented by counsel received less of
a multiple of payment to medical and wage loss (and less quickly) than those
76. PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS 1, Table VII-1, at 84.
77. Id.
78. PERSONAL INJURY II, at 260-63.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 248-51.
82. Id. at 252-55.
83. See the following table:
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not represented by counsel; " those with small (or no) losses (zero to $500) who
were represented by counsel received a greater multiple of payment to medical
and wage loss (but less quickly) than those not represented by counsel.8" Simi-
larly, another DOT study of seriously injured auto accident victims shows that
See also permanent disfigurement data in PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS 11 at 256-59, where, for
example, paid claimants settling claims within one-year after an accident, with attorney representa-
tion, had average losses of $4,000 and recovered (after one-third legal fees) $9,300, or two to three
times their loss. Those settling claims within one-year, without attorney representation, had average
losses of $3,710 and recovered $9,310, or two to five times their loss.
84. See the following table:
TABLE 14
AVERAGE PAY/LOSS RATIO FOR PAID VICTIMS IN $2,001 OR MORE LOSS
CATEGORY, WITH AND WITHOUT ATTORNEY REPRESENTATION AND
TIME FROM ACCIDENT TO TORT SETTLEMENT
$2,001 or more
No Attorney Attorney
No
Lawsuit Lawsuit
Avg. loss $4,854 $5,076 $5,806
Avg. payment $8,194 $8,443 $11,403
Ratio (after 1/3 1.7 1.1 1.3
legal fees)
Number of victims
in category 274 381 578
Days from accident
to settlement 181-550 181-550 551-999+
and
% of victims' cases 50% 58% 73%
settled
Source: U.S. Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee. Derived from PERSONAL
INJURY CLAIMS II at 220-21, 224-25, 226-27.
85. See the following tables:
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TABLE 15
AVERAGE PAY/LOSS RATIO FOR PAID "VICTIMS" IN $0 LOSS
CATEGORY. WITH AND WITHOUT ATTORNEY REPRESENTATION AND
TIME FROM ACCIDENT TO TORT SETTLEMENT
$0 Loss
No Attorney
Avg. loss
Avg. payment
Ratio (after 1/3
legal fees)
Number of "victims"
in category
Days from accident
to settlement
and
% of "victims"'
cases settled
$0
$164
1,526
1-30
63%
Attorney
Lawsuit Lawsuit
$0 $0
$972 $3,540
184
91-365
78
366-998
Source: U.S. Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee. Derived from PERSONAL
INJURY CLAIMS II and 220-21, 224-25, 226-27.
TABLE 16
AVERAGE PAY/LOSS RATIO FOR PAID VICTIMS IN $1-150 LOSS
CATEGORY. WITH AND WITHOUT ATTORNEY REPRESENTATION AND
TIME FROM ACCIDENT TO TORT SETTLEMENT
$0-$150 Loss
No Attorney
Avg. loss
Avg. payment
Ratio (after 1/3
legal fees)
Number of victims
in category
Days from accident
to settlement
and
% of victims' cases
settled
$52
$172
3.3
8,420
1-60
65%
Attorney
Lawsuit
$71
$437
4.1
91-365
Lawsuit
$74
$555
5.0
551-999+
Source: U.S. Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee. Derived from PERSONAL
INJURY CLAIMS II at 220-21, 224-25, 226-27.
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those with medical, wage and future income loss in excess of $10,000 who were
successful in recovering in tort without an attorney obtained a comparable
percent of payment to loss as those with similar losses who recovered in tort
with an attorney.8 6
Why is this? The pressures inherent in the bargaining process created by the
tort-adversary system cause insurance company claim-adjustors who want to
"control" the case (some are trained to do so)" to offer a settlement to the
victim without counsel which is somewhat comparable to a settlement with
plaintiff's counsel in order to avoid the risk that the victim will get a lawyer
and thereby increase total insurance company expenses."' This is particularly
TABLE 17
AVERAGE PAY/LOSS RATIO FOR PAID VICTIMS IN $151-S500 LOSS
CATEGORY. WITH AND WITHOUT ATTORNEY REPRESENTATION AND
TIME FROM ACCIDENT TO TORT SETTLEMENT
$15 1-S500 Loss
No Attorney Attorney
No
Lawsuit Lawsuit
Avg. loss $271 $295 $297
Avg. payment $669 $1,071 51,356
Ratio (after 1/3 2.4 2.4 3.1
legal fees)
Number of victims
in category 2.571 2.645 1,235
Days from accident
to settlement 1-90 91-365 551-999 +
and
% of victims 56% 66% 65%
cases settled
Source: U.S. Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee. Derived from PERSONAL
INJURY CLAIMS II. at 220-21. 224-25. 226-27.
86. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES 1, Table 38FS1, at 308-Il.
87. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm, on the
Judiciary, The Insurance Industry. 90th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 14, at 8486, 8492 (1968).
88. Id. at 8492-93. See also NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, AUTOMO-
BILE INSURANCE STUDY BACKGROUND MEMORANDUM IN REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE PROBLEMS 100 (1969); H. Ross, supra note 13, at 18-23; J. ROSENBLOOM,
AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY CLAIMS 98-104 (1968).
See also testimony of John J. O'Brien before the Senate Committee considering national no-
fault legislation, where Mr. O'Brien, a lawyer who was employed for approximately II years by
insurance companies in various claims positions, including those of adjuster, examiner, and man-
ager, said "that in the insurance business a good settlement most frequently was not one that was
fair . . .[and] that the present system works unfairly. It favors the affluent and mitigates against
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true if the claimant has a good case on liability or would make a good witness
before a jury." In addition, in small value cases 90 the legal and administrative
cost in defending a claim is greater than the cost to an insurance company of
an inflated settlement." It should be noted also that the fact that the victims in
the survey from which Tables 13 through 17 were derived were "paid" claim-
ants is "an implicit concession that they passed the liability threshold." 9 Per-
haps victims with large losses and questionable liability would not have re-
covered at all without the assistance of counsel. Furthermore, "large value cases
are more likely to attract attorneys and be contested by suit." '9
The present system is not only unjust but it is grossly inefficient. Automobile
tort-insurance "would appear to possess the highly dubious distinction of hav-
ing probably the highest cost-benefit ratio of any major compensation systems
currently in operation in this country."'" According to DOT, "tort liability
insurance would appear to cost in the neighborhood of $1.07 in total system
expenses to deliver $1.00 in net benefits to victims." 95 In other words, every
dollar received by an accident victim represents $2.07 that the public has put
into the system. Tort-insurance returns only 44 cents of each premium dollar96
to injured claimants-it could return as much as 80 cents. 97
the poor. The individual injured in an auto accident who is living from paycheck to paycheck is a
soft touch for an experienced adjuster.
"I have in my own experience defended settlements that I have made, third-party liability
settlements, to my immediate superiors, and when they didn't compliment me, I have said to them
'but it was a fair settlement'. And most often as not, they would turn to me and say, 'Fair, but
not a good settlement'. And we knew what was meant by a good settlement. The first call settlement
made by an adjuster for the out-of-pocket expenses, plus a few dollars over and above for inconveni-
ence, pain and suffering is considered a good settlement. Insurance companies favor first call
settlements for the primary purpose of closing out claims before the injured parties fully realize
the extent of their damages or injuries." Hearings Before the Senate Commerce Comm. on Auto-
mobile Insurance Reform and Cost Savings, 92d Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 3, at 927-29 (1971); Testi-
mony of John J. O'Brien, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance, 92d Cong.,
Ist Sess. pt. I, at. 151-55 (1971).
89. J. ROSENBLOOM, supra note 88, at 138-41.
90. These cases constitute 79 percent of all paid claimants with $0 to $500 of medical and wage
losses according to the data in PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS i, at 5.
91. For example, in U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT LITIGATION 7
(1970) it is stated that "[diefendants' lawyers received an average of $819 per case regardless of
the verdict." See also J. ROSENBLOOM, supra note 88, at 99-101.
92. PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS I at 66.
93. Id.
94. MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES 95.
95. Id. at 51.
96. MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES 51.
97. This assumes group no-fault auto insurance. The recently published "Study of Hawaii's
Motor Vehicle Insurance Program," conducted by Haldi Associates, Inc., for the Legislative
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No-Fault Can Save Lives
Theoretical reflection and statistics from Puerto Rico, the first American juris-
diction to adopt no-fault automobile accident compensation insurance suggest
that the most important public-policy advantage of the system proposed by
Committee Print No. I would be human rather than economic.
Under the tort system there are no built-in incentives to improve emergency
health care facilities and programs; just as there are no built-in incentives for
the victim to participate in rehabilitation programs. 9s As a matter of fact, in
those jurisdictions which impose a maximum recovery in wrongful death cases
by law, but no maximums in injury cases, there is a positive economic reason
for insurance carriers to look the other way when confronted with reports of
the woefully inadequate state of ambulance and emergency health care facili-
ties.9 9 For both the ambulance services and the hospital emergency rooms, the
Auditor of the State of Hawaii (SPECIAL REPORT No. 72-1, January, 1972), and submitted to that
State's legislature pursuant to House Concurrent Resolution No. 93, H.D. I (which requested the
Legislative Auditor's Office to conduct the study), examined, among other things, the cost implica-
tions and potential savings under the five major reform alternatives displayed in the following table
(STUDY OF HAWAII'S MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE PROGRAM 97):
TABLE 18
SUMMARY OF PREMIUM SAVINGS FOR FIVE MAJOR REFORM
PROPOSALS
Range of Savingsb
(Percent
1. Existing tort liability/private, group insurance .............. 15
2. Existing tort liability/exclusive state fund .................. 29
3. Complete no-fault/private, individual insurance ............. 8-28
4. Complete no-fault/private, group insurance ................ 22-40
5. Complete no-fault/exclusive state fund .................... 35-50
aAssumes that other sources of existing insurance coverage are consumed before
automobile coverage applies. See table 14-2 for details.
bFor the no-fault plans, low saving figures reflect high. frequency/high severiry
experience and high savings reflect low frequency/low severity experience.
98. See text at notes 114-57 infra.
99. See TRAFFIC SAFETY REPORT 43-56; and also Altman, supra note 2:"... the problem was
not just one for the cities but also for 'rural areas where 70 percent of deaths from highway
collisions occur.'"
See also The State of the Union, supra note 74, at H 154. President Nixon noted that:
[Tihe loss to our economy from accidents last year is estimated at over $28 billion [and
traffic accidents accounted for some 60 percent]. These are sad and staggering fig-
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tort system in financial responsibility states is a disaster. Many seriously injured
victims treated with emergency services will recover no money at all because
the defendant carried no insurance. In fact, 58 percent of the victims so treated
never recover in tort because they are unable to prove fault or freedom from
contributory negligence. "' Thus those who provide medical emergency services
will often not be paid unless the automobile victim has other resources."" In
the remaining cases, particularly the more serious ones, the hospital may have
to wait more than a year until the case is settled and it can be paid.""2 The
economic consequence of these facts on the emergency health care system is
horrendous because "approximately one-third of all ambulance runs are made
to carry persons injured by motor vehicles."" 3 One-third of all emergency
medical service is for injury resulting from vehicular accidents.'" Is it any
wonder that the emergency room in almost every hospital in America operates
at a loss? How can the directors of non-profit hospitals justify investing in
emergency health care facilities such as helicopters and spectrophometers or
hiring specialists rather than interns to work in such facilities? A respected
Advisory Committee that evaluated the emergency health care system a few
years ago concluded that "what is lacking is money.""1s The tort system simply
doesn't provide that money.
On the other hand, under no-fault each motorist would carry automobile
compensation insurance which would assure payment of all emergency and
medical costs of the driver, his passengers and any injured pedestrian. Payment
must be made within 30 days after the bill is rendered or the insurance carrier
must pay interest on the unpaid balance at the rate of 24 percent a year. It
doesn't take a mathematician to know that far more money will be available
for emergency health care facilities under such a system than is available under
the present system. In addition, since insurance carriers will pay out less money
in benefits if the victim survives, recovers and returns to work, than if he dies
or is permanently disabled, it will be in their economic self-interest to make
ures-especially since this toll could be greatly reduced by upgrading our emergency
medical services (Emphasis added).
The President continued by saying that he was
directing the Department of Health, Education and Welfare to develop new ways of
organizing emergency medical services and of providing care to accident victims. (Em-
phasis added.)
100. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES 1, Table 7S at 86, and Table 15S at 149.
101. See ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES ], Table 32S at 28 1-82, and discussion in note 37 supra.
102. See ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES I, Table 47FS1, at 340; Table 13, supra note 83, Table
14, supra note 84.
103. TRAFFIC SAFETY REPORT 44.
104. Hearings before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary. The Insurance Industry, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 18B, Table IV at 13,754 n. 6 (1971).
105. TRAFFIC SAFETY REPORT 52.
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loans and grants to hospitals to enable medical facilities to invest in expensive
new equipment or to expand capacity. The national no-fault legislation should
be amended to require that some percentage of all automobile insurance prem-
ium dollars collected be invested in such life-saving equipment. 10 .5 ' Capital
investments in humanity, that would pay dividends in life and health, are a
reasonable requirement to make on an industry whose underwriting profit will
increase under no-fault.
Would it make a difference? Yes. According to a study prepared for the
Department of Transportation in 1971: "Twenty-three percent of fatalities died
of probably survivable injuries due to problems throughout the emergency care
system."' '06 Elsewhere the study observes:
It is furthermore quite disheartening to realize that of 67 individuals
who died after leaving the scene of the crash, almost half were felt
to have died of injuries that were either definitely or possibly surviva-
ble. This figure is even more startling when it is realized that the
estimation of survivability was based on anatomic data only, and
that the surgeon who reviewed these cases felt that the evaluation
was too conservative. 07
According to another nationwide study, "it is a certain fact that a considera-
ble number of the individuals involved would be salvaged from permanent
disability or death if a more sophisticated emergency medical response system
were operative."'0s Dr. Robert H. Kennedy of the American College of Sur-
geon's Section on Trauma estimated that 20,000 lives a year would be saved
with better attention at the scene of the accidents and better transportation
facilities.' Another surgeon has estimated that 25 percent of all persons perma-
nently disabled in highway accidents would not be crippled if proper care and
transportation had been available after the accident." 0 Under the present sys-
tem, according to a prominent Philadelphia physician: "In injury cases, we
105. 1. [Editor's note:] See note 8, supra. Committee Prints Two and Three contain a provision
requiring "insurers to assist State agencies administering or supervising the State highway safety
program in the development and maintenance of the most effective possible emergency medical
response system. To finance an effective emergency medical response, insurers in the State would
be required to invest 1 percent of their gross no-fault premiums in grants, loans, or equity invest-
ments in emergency medical and transportation facilities, programs, and equipment within the
State. Failure to make such investments would result in termination of the insurer's authority to
write qualified no-fault policies in the State." Staff Analysis, at viii and ix; Committee Print Two.
§ 8, at 28-31 of Committee Print Two and § 110, at 24-27 of Committee Print Three.
106. ALCOHOL AND HIGHWAY SAFETY, supra note 74, at xxi and 248.
107. Id. at 67.
108. TRAFFIC SAFETY REPORT 46.
109. Id. at 47.
110. Id. at 46-47.
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have often had trouble getting an insurance carrier to admit financial responsi-
bility for a patient, and a hospital can't afford to carry them merely hoping
for a settlement later on .... "I"
The results of recent experiments using helicopters rather than conventional
ambulances give us an example of what can be done. The Maryland State Police
use three Bell Ranger jet helicopters for accident-injury rescue in conjunction
with the Shock Trauma Center of the University of Maryland Hospital. In
197 1, the helicopters "brought 155 badly injured persons directly from accident
scenes to the trauma center. Of these victims, 129 lived. Doctors at the trauma
center estimate that 94 of the survivors would have died had they not been flown
to the center."' 12
The human consequences of no-fault in Puerto Rico are startling. In 1969,
the last year of the tort system, there were 54 1 highway fatalities out of 538,000
registered cars driven a total of 4.3 billion miles. In 1971, the second complete
year under partial no-fault, there were 48 1 highway fatalities out of 686,659
registered cars driven a total of 5.6 billion miles. In percentages, that means
that the number of highway deaths in Puerto Rico per 100 million miles driven
has declined 32 percent since no-fault was enacted. "13
Furthermore, national no-fault will be a useful and effective supplement to
the proposed Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act. Under no-
fault, actuaries will compute premium-dollar cost on the basis of the probability
of injury and the extent of such, injury to the policy-holder and his family,
friends and other potential passengers. Undoubtedly, the companies will de-
mand higher premium payments from the owner of an automobile with only
the minimum safety equipment and protection required by federal regulations
than they will from the owner of a "maximum safety" automobile which could
be involved in a serious accident without the occupants suffering more than
minor bruises. The annual insurance premium cost for a "flimsy" car as op-
posed to a "maximum safety" car may be an important factor in the buyer's
mind-and in the manufacturer's.
I ll. J. O'CONNELL, supra note 74, at 23.
112. Watson, Saving Time Saves Accident Victims Lives, Washington Post, Feb. 6, 1972, at
D-I, col. 5.
113. Letter to Senator Warren G. Magnuson from Frank W. Fournier, Executive Director,
Administration for The Compensation of Automobile Accidents, San Juan, Puerto Rico, January
24, 1972, filed with the Senate Commerce Committee. Note that the death-rate decrease may be
greater than can be expected on the mainland because the Puerto Rican law established a state fund
insurance office similar to our Social Security Administration, and that office (Administration) has
established medical emergency clinics throughout the island out of premium funds collected. It will
be interesting to see if private insurers in the continental United States will do the same.
[Vol. 21:259
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Rehabilitation
Although the tort-insurance system fails to provide proper medical care and
rehabilitation for the seriously injured, it encourages medical tests, X-rays and
doctor's visits "which ordinarily would not be necessary" for the less-than-
seriously injured. The slightly injured person's small medical costs are "built-
up"1" ' resulting in large "pain and suffering" awards (and bigger attorney's
fees),"1 5 a waste and misallocation of medical resources and the prolongation
of ill-health.
A leading and active practitioner in the field of neurosurgery for twenty years
testified before the House Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance that "[i]t
is possible that our present insurance system can actually prolong symp-
toms.""I He explained:
I think all doctors consider it a self-evident truth that patients who
suffer from medical-legal injuries have symptoms that are markedly
prolonged compared to the same injuries that occur when secondary
114. H. Ross, supra note 13, at 108-09, 118-19, 139-40, cited in J. O'CONNELL, supra note 74,
at 31-35.
For a general discussion of the various ways by which the "build-up" of "the specials" (medical
and wage loss) is accomplished, see J. ROSENBLOOM, supra note 88, at 106-1I.
115. See the following table:
TABLE 19
AVERAGE PAYMENT FROM TORT-INSURANCE TO AVERAGE MEDICAL AND
WAGE LOSS FOR $ TO $150 CATEGORY BY RESIDENTIAL AREAS
Urban Residential Suburban Residential Rural Residential
Without - With Without With Without With
Attorney Attorney Attorney Attorney Attorney Attorney
Average Loss $54 $74 $54 $68 $50 $67
Average Payment $169 $453 $182 $490 $157 $513
Ratio (after 1/3
legal fees) 3.1 4.1 3.5 4.6 3.1 5.1
Number of
Victims 3,952 2,288 3,113 1,342 1,414 240
Source: U.S. Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee. Derived from PERSONAL INJURY
CLAIMS II at 108-19.
This premise appears to be borne out by the total recovered losses in very small cases for those
who settle with and without an attorney. Note also the wide difference in average losses (most-if
not all-are for medical bills) on these very small claims. Since payment from tort-insurance is
predicated on the amount of medical bills (and wage loss), how can it be said that the present system
is "tailoring compensation to individual needs and satisfies an individual sense of justice?" If
anything, this data indicates that the present system is patently unjust.
116. Hearings on H. R. 7514 and H. R. 241 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance
of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Comm., No-FAULT MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE,
92d Cong., Ist Sess., pt. I, at 158 (1971) (testimony of Dr. Bernard F. Finneson).
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gain is not a factor. For example, if an individual suffers a fall in
his own bathtub and strikes his head, he may develop a headache
and he will take something like aspirin or some mild analgesic, and
this will subside in a day or two. The same impact or the same force
or injury that will occur with a vehicular accident can ordinarily be
expected to take months and sometimes years before improving ....
As a consulting physician, I see many patients every week who fall
within this category. These individuals are usually involved in a
vehicular accident where the extent of the trauma is minimal. How-
ever minimal the trauma, the symptoms persist and remain una-
bated. X-rays and many other studies are done, and these are nor-
mal, and because of the persistence of headaches or other aches and
pains, consultation with one or many specialists is often requested.
Almost invariably these patients with prolonged symptoms are in-
volved in lengthy, long-drawn-out medical-legal dealings. In most
cases, they have consulted with attorneys who have advised them to
defer settlement of their medical claim since "you never know how
long it will take to get well.""
Elaborating on this last statement, he told the subcommittee:
. . . [O]ne must realize that oftentimes the doctor who is treating
his patient and wants the symptoms to subside as quickly as possible
is working counter to the desires of the attorney whose job it is to
secure for his client the largest possible settlement.
In attempting to do the best job for his client, the lawyer will want
to assure himself that he is not settling the case too early. He will
often request additional X-rays and additional tests to assure that
nothing has been missed. He may feel that it is his job to ask the
patient, 'Are you sure that you still don't have symptoms?' or in
many cases, being knowledgeable about certain injuries, may even
ask leading questions. In many cases management of this sort can
only tend to prolong symptoms ...
What effect does such prolongation of symptoms have in the lives
of the patients? It, of course, interferes with their activities of daily
living and, in many cases, prevents them from resuming their
work. 118
The doctor concluded by saying that he believed that "the system of no-fault
insurance . . . will result in a more speedy recovery overall for many pa-
tients." "I
117. Id. at 157.
118. Id. at 158-59.
119. Id. at 159.
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The DOT studies explored in-depth the tort-insurance system's sickeningly
slow procedures for delivering funds for medical care, rehabilitation and incone
security. But even if, and when, there is compensation, the money is paid in a
single lump-sum. The system's standard and traditional claims procedure, a
one-time lump-sum settlement, exchanged for a written and binding release in
a hostile adversary environment inhibits the restoration of health and the re-
sumption of a useful and satisfying life.2 0 Dr. John Henle, former administrator
of public rehabilitation programs and former Director of Rehabilitation of
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, has spelled out how the tort-system
hinders rehabilitation in his study on the "Rehabilitation of Auto Accident
Victims" for the Department of Transportation.2 1 In his words:
The traditional settlement environment for third-party auto bodily
injury claims offers nothing to encourage and much to preclude the
early introduction of rehabilitation. Not only must fault and degree
of disability be agreed to by opposing sides, but a bargain must be
struck and dollar value assigned to the damages . . . .Thus, consid-
erable time, energy and expense must be devoted to controversy just
when rehabilitation measures might most benefit the victim. The
disabled person will usually be the focus of conflicting efforts toward
the financial settlement of his 'case', and here questions of fault and
degree of disability press for immediate answer.
Too often the accident victim's own energies are directed toward
retribution instead of restoration. In this misdirected effort, he may
be encouraged by his family, his attorney, the adversary posture of
the company involved, or by his own bewilderment and frustra-
tion. 122
That the adversary process fails to provide for human needs is well documented
in other DOT studies. One survey found that no rehabilitation program was
suggested to 88.6 percent of seriously injured accident victims., Of the 11.7
percent to whom rehabilitation was recommended, only two percent were re-
ferred by an insurance company. 24 Of those victims who participated in a
rehabilitation program, 27 percent paid for the services themselves. 2 Eighty-
five and six tenths percent of program participants said that they did not receive
120. MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES 8.
121. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, REHABILITATION OF AUTO ACCIDENT VICTIMS (1970)
(prepared by J. Henle).
122. Id. at 13.
123. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES i, Table 216S at 377.
124. Id. Table 218S at 378.
125. Id. Table 223S at 382.
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a cash allowance for living expenses for themselves and their family during any
part of the period of rehabilitation.' 20
There is no question that severely injured auto accident victims could, and
should, make more use of the state-federal rehabilitation programs under the
Vocational Rehabilitation Act' 27 than they are at present. Department of
Health, Education and Welfare data indicates that at least 101,000 impairments
resulting from moving motor vehicle accidents in 1967 caused substantial limi-
tation on the victim's usual major activity (ability to work, keep house, or
engage in school or pre-school activities).'2 8 The Staff of the Rehabilitation
Services Administration recently informed Senate Antitrust and Monopoly
Subcommittee staff that:
At any given time during a recent given year, 1,500 persons with
severe spinal cord injuries are in rehabilitation status, and 1,000 of
these stem from motor vehicle accidents. This represents only an
estimated 4,000 new cases with such injuries from auto accidents
each year. 2 9
126. Id., Table 224S at 382.
127. 42 U.S.C. § 1351 (1969). The Rehabilitation Act of 1972 (H.R. 8395), which would
amend the Vocational Rehabilitation Act by extending and revising the authorization of grants to
states, was passed by the House on a vote of 327 to 0. 118 Cong. Rec. H.2219-38 (daily ed. March
20, 1972).
128. REHABILITATION OF ACCIDENT VICTIMS, supra note 12 1, at 26.
129. Telephone interview, December, 1971. See also letter from The American Occupational
Therapy Association, Inc. to Senator Warren G. Magnuson, May 28, 1971, and reprinted in
Hearings Before the Senate Commerce Comm. on Automobile Insurance Reform and Cost
Savings, 92d Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 4 at 1957-58 (1971), wherein it was stated:
Motor vehicle accidents are probably the greatest single cause of injuries requiring exten-
sive rehabilitative and restoratory care. They produce a shockingly high number of spinal
cord injuries each year, resulting in paraplegia (permanent paralysis from the waist
down) and quadriplegia (permanent paralysis from the neck down). Auto accidents are
the cause also of large numbers of amputations, extensive and often permanent damage
to vital joints, internal injuries so severe that they are disabling for years or for life, and
a great variety of other serious handicapping conditions.
The care required involves long periods of time in expensive hospital facilities, a vast
array of medical equipment and devices (some of which must be custom-made), and the
services of many types of health professionals. The amount of money required is usually
far beyond an individual's or family's financial means, even with the assistance of
hospital and medical insurance. If the injured person is the family's bread-winner, finan-
cial problems are obviously compounded.
The tragedy of accidental injury should not be unduly complicated by financial distress.
To be most effective, total rehabilitation of the injured should proceed promptly, without
delay due to financial probems. Large numbers of our professional occupational thera-
pists work daily with patients who are the victims of these accidents and they see first-
hand the results of neglect after injury, and particularly delays after the acute stages,
because of the lack of an adequate system for paying the costs of full restorative care.
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The total cost of spinal injury cases, if properly managed, averages around
$50,000, ' 3" but "a spinal cord injury case, if improperly managed, can easily
add up to an expenditure of $500,000 during a victim's life time."'' The proper
management of a spinal-cord-injury case (or any injury case requiring rehabili-
tation) includes beginning the rehabilitation techniques promptly. 32 This costs
money-tort-insurance pays very slowly. 33 Instead of tort-insurance promoting
a "hopefully useful and satisfying life," 34 it helps foster a life of heartbreak
for the permanently disabled needing rehabilitative treatment.
In addition to those victims with substantial limitation on their major activi-
ties, "another 459,000 ... were limited in the amount or kind of major activity
participation" in 1967.11
Five hundred and sixty thousand moving vehicle accident victims
could have made use of rehabilitation services. But only 29,000 or
14.2% of the total actually undergoing rehabilitation had disabilities
classified as caused by 'accidents, injuries, and poisonings,' the clas-
sification in which auto accident victims would fall.' 3 6
The hundreds of thousands of injured victims not being served by this "major,
virtually unused resource which has scarcely been tapped by the private auto
insurance industry . . .",1 are also victims of a system being operated more
for retribution than human restitution.
Under no-fault, in general, and the Hart-Magnuson bill in particular, reha-
bilitation of the automobile accident victim could become the single most im-
portant element in the benefits "package." For the first time insurance compa-
nies would have an economic incentive to help and encourage their injured
policyholders to enter rehabilitation and retraining programs. The victim who
is helped to resume a productive life will cost the insurance company less
money. According to the bill, if he is not returned to gainful employment, his
insurer will have to continue to pay all his lost wages indefinitely. By joining
the self-interest of the insurer in minimizing claims payments to the resources
and expertise potentially available under the state-federal rehabilitation pro-
grams, no-fault will reduce much tragic and unnecessary human suffering and
restore to productivity and enterprise many who are today doomed to lives of
130. Id.
131. JOURNAL OF AMERICAN INSURANCE, Jan./ Feb. 1972, at 16, 19.
132. Id. at 16-17.
133. FOR WHOSE BENEFIT 33.
134. REHABILITATION OF AUTO ACCIDENT VICTIMS, supra note 121, at 5.
135. Id. at 26.
136. Id. See also MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES 59.
137. Id. at 27. See also MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES 60.
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empty futility by an outmoded and inhumane system. Even better results would
be obtained if the bill were amended to require automobile insurers to invest a
percentage of all premium dollars collected in capital loans and contributions
to state and local rehabilitation centers. 37
In recent years, some insurance companies have begun to use various ar-
rangements to initiate rehabilitation and to reduce the length of time it takes
to get funds to the severely-injured-with-clear-liability cases. One of the more
common techniques is interim or advance payments. DOT insurance industry
advisory subcommittee report described this method of payment as "a new
claim practice designed to speed rehabilitation and to provide some financial
relief during the recovery period by advancing moneys in uncontested cases to
pay for expenses as they are incurred." This technique is normally applicable
to the more serious claims.3 0 This "new claim practice" attempts to overcome
some of the problems associated with lump-sum payments. 39
But, as long as fault finding and the adversary atmosphere inherent in the
bargaining-litigation-settlement process remains, there are bound to be
contested claims over liability-particularly for the permanently disabled
claimant with large losses. There is greater attorney involvement in more seri-
ous injury cases,4 0 and the percentage of tort claimants who retain counsel
and the percentage of those who actually file lawsuits "tend to increase as the
amount of economic loss increases."'' According to the DOT data, attorney
representation in these types of cases has an adverse effect on the utilization of
advance payments. For instance, in those cases where medical and wage loss
was $10,001 to $25,000, 82 percent of the paid claimants retained counsel,"'
but only 10 percent of these claimants were covered by advance payments.4 3
Thirty-seven percent of the claimants not represented by counsel were covered
by advance payments for the same loss category.' The permanently injured
claimant is placed in an impossible dilemma by a system incapable of caring.
He may try to get a large monetary verdict and judgment after waiting as long
137.1 [Editor's note] See notes 8 and 105 supra. Committee Prints Two and Three would "pro-
vide funds to construct new rehabilitation facilities or improve existing facilities, [and] each in-
surer writing qualifying no-fault policies in a State would be required to invest I percent of the
total no-fault premiums it collects in that State in grants, loans, or equity investments for the
construction or improvement of rehabilitation facilities." Staff Analysis, at viii of Committee
Print Two, and § 109, at 22-24 of Committee Print Three. § 7, at 25-28.
138. PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS I at 120 (emphasis added).
139. Id. See also J. O'CONNELL, supra note 74, at 16-19.
140. PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS I at 73, 95.
141. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES I at 49.
142. PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS Ii at 5, II.
143. PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS I Table VII-10, at 96.
144. Id.
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as six years (assuming that he has other resources to sufficiently cover his lost
earning power, which many do not), but the price he and his family will pay
for the absence of rehabilitation services may be a lifetime of otherwise unneces-
sary misery.
Successful claimants who manage to get advance paymens are "but a tiny
fraction of all third-party liability bodily injury claimants."'4 This is because
of the strict screening procedures of the companies,' and because, as the DOT
study reveals, 33 percent of the seriously injured in that survey were involved
in one-car accidents"17 and another 25 percent were ineligible for tort-insurance
due to contributory negligence, guest passenger statutes, and immunities such
as governments', inter-spousal, intra-familial, and that of charitable organiza-
tions.4 8 The DOT found that only nine percent of the seriously injured victims
with loss of $2,500 or more received some advance payment before eventually
recovering their tort settlement for which they had to wait an average of 15
months.'
Professor O'Connell's conclusion that "'[a]dvance payments' ... are only
a flickering indication of what a genuinely compassionate and sensible insur-
ance arrangement could be like" is the most that can be said for this very
limited remedy for the overwhelming faults of the present system. 50 He reminds
us that "[i]n the meantime . ..the old adversary game based on fault-with
all its harshness, delays, unfairness, and waste-goes on." '5'
Certainly few would dispute that tort-insurance is unbelievably slow in get-
ting compensation to injured victims. The adversary climate of the system feeds
on itself and thereby promotes delay--especially for the permanently injured.
The more serious a person's injuries and loss, the more likely he will retain
counsel, and will file a lawsuit.' As a consequence, the injured person's expen-
145. REHABILITATION OF AUTO ACCIDENT VICTIMS, supra note 121, at 17.
146. Id. at 14-17.
147. MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES 36; ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES I, Table 201 FS at 365.
148. See ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES 1, Table 7S at 86, and Table 15S at 149. This figure is
computable as follows:
194,412 (Table 15 S) = 42%
454,166 (Table 7 S)
42 percent recovered from Net Tort while 58 percent did not. Subtracting 33 percent (because of
one-car accidents [table 201 FS at 365]) from 58 percent produces the 25 percent net recovery.
149, ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES 1, TABLE 47FS1, at 340.
150. J. O'CONNELL, supra note 74, at 27. See also MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES 96.
15 I. Id.
152. See notes 139 and 140 supra.
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ses will mount, and his bargaining position will become the more "pathetically
inadequate"' ' while that of the insurance company will become stronger. The
end result is that the system helps the insurance companies wax rich on their
investments from liability reserves' while the victim waits for possible recovery
from tort-insurance. The people who can least afford it-the maimed and in-
jured-may have to endure years of hardship and even deprivation, but the
system could care less. The most seriously injured among them suffered most;
14 percent had to move to cheaper quarters, 29 percent had to miss credit
payments, 30 percent had to take money from savings or sales of property, 28
percent borrowed money, 22 percent had to have another member of the family
go to work, and 45 percent had to change their way of living.5 I Of course, delay
is not the only culprit-no payment and underpayment contribute their share
of hardship. For instance, one DOT study of seriously injured victims disclosed
tha the families of I I percent of fatality victims, and nine percent of the long
and short term disabled victims, recovered no reparations from any source.'56
In fact, one-fourth of the fatally and permanently injured recovered from all
sources less than 50 percent of their medical, wage, and future earnings loss.'57
Thus, advance payments is a case of "too little, too late" and yet another
illustration of why we must cease tinkering with a fundamentally unjust and
incurable system. Instead, we must replace it with one that delivers benefits,
saves lives, and rehabilitates victims.
Conclusion
Fifty years have passed since meaningful efforts were begun to produce and
effectuate a humane and efficient substitute for the wasteful and unproductive
tort-insurance system. Enough. The time has come for action by the Congress
of the United States and the President to permit the people to enjoy the benefits
of no-fault insurance compensation.
Many lawyers oppose no-fault. Lawyers have been justly and sharply criti-
cized for putting their pocketbook interest in fees ahead of their greater interest
and duty, as citizens and officers of the court, in a smooth and well-ordered
sysem.58 But the most incisive expression of the case for change was written
by a man who is not only a lawyer, but the lawyer who was the first President
153. J. O'CONNELL, supra note 74, at 20.
154. See 117 CONG. REC. S13,401, Table I (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1971).
155. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES I, TABLE 56FS1, at 362-63.
156. Id. Table 52 FSI, at 353.
157. Id. See also Table 7, supra note 35.
158. See Editorial, The Life and Times of No-Fault, 57 A.B.A.J. 1114-15 (Nov. 1971). The
editors "repeat the hope of last May's editorial (page 487) that no lawyer will oppose no-fault
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and co-founder of the American Trial Lawyers Association, the trade group
which spearheads the opposition to reform. Mr. Benjamin Marcus wrote:
We are convinced that No Fault is the only way out of the wasteful,
irrelevant, burdensome and exasperating procedure now employed
to compensate victims of automobile injury. We feel it is probable
that when the dust has all cleared, No Fault will be conceded by all
to be substantially speedier, less wasteful, and more fair than our
present system.'59
The time for enactment of national no-fault auto insurance is long overdue.
because of a supposed self-interest in preserving the legal fees produced by the present system."
They go on to say:
In the reform movement now under way, the objectives should be the best system for
the public, and in the attainment of that goal lawyers must explain the problems and
lead in their solutions. (Emphasis added).
159. Letter from Benjamin Marcus, Muskegon, Michigan to Senator Philip A. Hart, June 28,
1971; reported in 117 CONG. REC. S12,463 (daily ed. July 29, 1971). See also Report of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Feb. 6, 1972, reprinted in the New York Law
Journal (Feb. 7, 1972), and reported in the N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1972, at 1, col. 7. The Association
is convinced "that the fault principle must be abolished ... We, therefore, endorse the 'no-fault'
principle and recommend its early enactment."
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